There is no Such Thing as Attention by Britt Anderson
HYPOTHESIS ANDTHEORY ARTICLE
published: 23 September 2011
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00246
There is no such thing as attention
Britt Anderson*
Department of Psychology and Centre for Theoretical Neuroscience, University ofWaterloo,Waterloo, ON, Canada
Edited by:
Shimon Edelman, Cornell University,
USA
Reviewed by:
Gary Cottrell, University of California
San Diego, USA
Gary Lupyan, University ofWisconsin
Madison, USA
*Correspondence:
Britt Anderson, Department of
Psychology and Centre for Theoretical
Neuroscience, University ofWaterloo,
200 University AvenueWest,
Waterloo, ON, Canada N2L 3G1.
e-mail: britt@uwaterloo.ca
Given that the core issues of attention research have been recognized for millenia, we do
not know as much about attention as we should. I argue that the reasons for this failure
are (1) we create spurious dichotomies, (2) we reify attention, treating it as a cause, when
it is an effect, and (3) we equate a collection of facts with a theory. In order to correct
these errors, we need a new technical vocabulary that allows for attentional effects to be
continuously distributed, rather than merely present or absent, and that provides a basis
for quantitative behavioral predictions that map onto neural substrates. The terminology
of the Bayesian decision process has already proved useful for structuring conceptual dis-
cussions in other psychological domains, such as perception and decision making under
uncertainty, and it had demonstrated early success in the domain of attention. By rejecting
a reiﬁed, causal conception of attention, in favor of theories that produce attentional effects
as consequences, psychologists will be able to conduct more deﬁnitive experiments. Such
conceptual advances will then enhance the productivity of neuroscientists by allowing
them to concentrate their data collection efforts on the richest soil.
Keywords: attention, Bayes, reification
INTRODUCTION
Attention may have to go, like many a faculty once deemed
essential, like many a verbal phantom, like many an idol of
the tribe. It may be an excrescence on Psychology. No need
of it to drag ideas before consciousness or ﬁx them, when we
see how perfectly they drag and ﬁx each other there.
James’(1890/1950).
Attention has been a cornerstone of psychological interest since
antiquity, and was one of the three pillars on which modern exper-
imental psychology was erected (Titchener, 1908). And yet, despite
all this time and the many investigations, our knowledge of atten-
tional phenomena is little changed from that of the ancientGreeks.
Quoting Aristotle (“. . .is it possible or not that one should be
able to perceive two objects simultaneously in the same individual
time?”) and Lucretius (“. . .things are not seen sharply ‘save those
forwhich themindhas prepared itself.”’),Hatﬁeld (1998) provides
the evidence in his review on attention and classical thought.
These ideas have remained preoccupations of experimental
psychology ever since. Echoing Aristotle, Angell and Pierce (1892)
wrote:“The essential question is whetherwe can interpret as simul-
taneous two or more disparate simultaneous sensations. . .” and
recently the same idea was central to Huang and Pashler (2007)
who stated “This question about [the] possibility of simultaneous
selection of two feature values is very fundamental.” Many of the
current papers on multiple object tracking can also be understood
as investigations into this same, 2000 year old, question (e.g., Drew
et al., 2009).
The Lucretian idea of expectancy was present in Helmholtz
(1881): “. . .we must form as clear a notion as possible of what we
expect to see. Then it will actually appear.”And recently,“SeeWhat
You Want to See: Motivational Inﬂuences on Visual Perception”
(Balcetis and Dunning, 2006). The quote by Lucretius also empha-
sizes the idea that objects which are the focus of attention might
in some way be perceived better; yet the claim that attention alters
perceptual quality is still actively debated (e.g., Carrasco, 2009).
Although we currently cite Cherry (1953) for the cocktail party
effect, the problem and its paradox was presented a few hun-
dred years earlier by Stewart (1792/1866): “When two persons
are speaking to us at once, we can attend to either of them at
pleasure. . .This power, however, of the mind to attend to either
speaker at pleasure, supposes that it is, at one and the same time,
conscious of the sensations which both produce.”
Thus, the core phenomena that motivate attention research
have been clearly appreciated for a very long time. However
the progress we have made has been slight. Contrast it with the
progress made on another preoccupation of Lucretius’, the atomic
nature of matter. Our poorer progress might be because attention
is the harder problem. Or it might be because of embedded mis-
conceptions about the nature of the term attention itself. If our
metaphors for attention guide our thinking (Fernandez-Duque
and Johnson, 1999), then we should look to these same metaphors
to account for our lack of progress.
I argue that our slow progress in understanding attention can
be attributed to three sources, two general and one speciﬁc. A
general fault of psychology is its predilection to binarize empirical
phenomena; we try and shoehorn everything into being either this
or that. As a result we construct and pursue false dichotomies. A
more speciﬁc error is that we misuse the word attention. Attention
has been plurally deﬁned and this leads to inconsistent usage and
confusion. More importantly, attention has been reiﬁed; it is used
as a concrete concept that can act in a causal fashion, e.g., “Atten-
tion helps optimize the use of our system’s limited resources. . .”
(Carrasco, 2009). This logical fallacy leads to misplaced empirical
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efforts. In fact, attention never causes anything, because there is
no such thing as attention. There are, however, many empirical
ﬁndings that can be accurately labeled attentional. In a phrase,
attention ismore adjectival thannominal (for an adverbial account
seeMole, 2011). The third impediment to faster progress in under-
standing attentional effects is the equating of data with theory.
While neuroscientists reify too (“Attention increases sensitivity of
V4 neurons”; Reynolds et al., 2000), the more important problem
for neuroscience is the tendency to emphasize data collecting over
theory. As Poincaré said, “Le savant doit ordonner; on fait la science
avec des faits comme une maison avec des pierres; mais une accumu-
lation de faits n’est pas plus une science qu’un tas de pierres n’est une
maison.”1 Studies reporting the patterns of functional brain acti-
vations or neuronal ﬁring while subjects perform tasks that yield
attentional effects will ultimately tell us much about the how of
attention, but not thewhat is attention; that kind of understanding
will require the combination of neuroscientiﬁc data with psycho-
logical theory. The challenge for a terminology of attention is to
put attention in the context of something to be explained rather
than axiomatically assumed.This conceptual transition fromcause
to effect must also provide a space for the sensible generation of
experiments and the deriving of mechanistic accounts fromneural
data.
The basic plan for the paper is as follows. First, I examine how
we invent false dichotomies and then how we have misused the
term attention. I then expand on the claim that neural data does
not enhance our understanding of attention per se. I conclude with
remarks on what an alternative approach to attention might look
like and highlight research results, old and new, that beneﬁt from
this perspective.
FALSE DICHOTOMIES ARE DETRIMENTAL TO ATTENTIONAL
RESEARCH
The allure and the limits of a binary approach to psychological
science were highlighted by Newell (1973) 40 years ago. In spite of
the caveats, the history of attentional research is a lengthening list
of putative either-or components (e.g., top-down/bottom-up; see
Table 1). This approach to attention research is harmful because
instead of addressing the core phenomenal components we pursue
a pseudo-question: is our dichotomy true?
While the statement that attentional cues are either endogenous
or exogenous is phrased as a choice between two distinct alterna-
tives, this appearance is an illusion. When we bisect outcomes in
this way, our terms do not provide a complete and disjoint parti-
tion of the relevant space. The question as to whether an object is
pink or purple is clearly poorly phrased. Because we know many
objects that are neither pink nor purple, and some that are both,we
can quickly detect our error. Pink and purple are not the names of
crisp, disjoint sets in color space. Membership in the class of pink
things is fuzzy. There are objects that have a non-zero membership
value in both the set of pink things and the set of purple things.
The same ﬂaws are present, but not as obvious, when approach-
ing attentional topics because our terms are variably deﬁned and
1The Scientist must set in order. Science is built up with facts, as a house is with
stones. But a collection of facts is no more a science than a heap of stones is a house.
(Wikiquote, http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Henri_Poincaré).
Table 1 |The bifurcation of attention.
Top-down Bottom-up
Exogenous Endogenous
Divided Focused
Feature Object
Local Global
Automatic Controlled
Voluntary Involuntary
Non-conscious Conscious
Peripheral Central
Intraperceptual Extraperceptual
Passive Active
Pre-attentive Attentive
the phenomena are much less familiar. To demonstrate the case, I
will brieﬂy discuss two examples of false dichotomies in attention
research: pre-attentive or attentive processing and endogenous or
exogenous cuing.
PRE-ATTENTIVE OR ATTENTIVE PROCESSING
As the name suggests, pre-attentive processing is “. . .temporally
prior to attention.” (Logan, 1992). The division presumes a ser-
ial process. First pre-attentive processing occurs and then subse-
quently attention happens. By hypothesis it would be contradic-
tory to speak of attentional effects on pre-attentive processing.
A quick march through the work on pre-attentive processing
shows that the assumption of a dichotomy has led to interpretative
stances that were more pronounced than the data warranted.
Some of the early evidence that led to this division is reviewed
in Treisman (1985). In the beginning, the conceptual division
into pre-attentive and attentive processing was clear, but the data
supporting such a crisp separation were not. One application of
this binary division was feature integration theory (FIT; Treis-
man and Gelade, 1980). The early version of FIT proposed that
identifying targets deﬁned by conjoined features required atten-
tion for binding, and this in turn required spatial localization.
Since identifying targets deﬁned by a single feature did not require
binding, and therefore did not require spatial localization, it could
be asserted that only single feature targets could be correctly
identiﬁed when mislocalized. Since localization was an obligatory
preliminary stage in the attentionally dependent binding process,
targets deﬁned by conjoined features could not be identiﬁed when
mislocalized.
While the early evidence tilted in this direction, it did not pro-
vide the clear separation the dichotomy required. For example
in Experiment VIII of Treisman and Gelade (1980) participants
correctly identiﬁed conjunction targets and feature targets about
80% of the time. If the accuracy focused on trials where the
mislocation was one position away from the true target posi-
tion, conjunction targets were accurately reported 72% of the
time and feature targets 82%. For mislocations of two or greater
positions it was 50 and 68% respectively. Clearly, there was a rela-
tionship between spatial location and accuracy of detection that
was stronger for targets deﬁned by conjoined features, but it was
not dichotomous.
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Another implication of the original version of FIT was that
“. . .[for] targets deﬁned by a single feature, the [spatial] cue should
have very little effect.” Figure 4 in Treisman (1985) shows an effect
of cue validity on the d ′ for feature search that is similar in shape,
though less extreme, to that for conjunction search; a quantitative
more than a qualitative effect. The ﬁnding of quantitative rather
than qualitative differences led Prinzmetal et al. (1986) to conclude
that“Contrary toTreisman andGelade (1980), features are not reg-
istered without attention.” Subsequently, researchers were forced
into contradiction when attentional cues were shown to speed tar-
get identiﬁcation in pre-attentive searches (e.g., Theeuwes et al.,
1999). Ultimately, the result was that we generated a lot of data.
A million trials later we conclude that in fact there are not two
distinct kinds of searches (Wolfe, 1998).
ENDOGENOUS OR EXOGENOUS CUE
The contrast between endogenous and exogenous cuing gives
another example of the inefﬁciency of pursuing axiomatic,
dichotomous divisions in attention research. In a common version
of a cuing task a participant reports the side of a target. Luminance
increments brieﬂy precede target presentation and are deemed to
be exogenous cues: cues that automatically attract attention. Cen-
trally presented arrows that point toward or away from the target’s
location are an example of an endogenous cue: cues where the
symbolic content mediates their effect.
In fact, it is not the case that endogenous cues must have a
learned, symbolic value. Centrally presented gaze direction is an
effective cue for locating a peripheral target (Ristic et al., 2002;
Brignani et al., 2009). Endogenous cues do not have to be predic-
tive (Dodd and Wilson, 2008). On the other hand, the automatic
response to exogenous cues is not necessarily automatic. In a clas-
sic study,Yantis and Jonides (1990) showed that when subjects are
engaged in a demanding task and have allocated their processing
resources to a particular location (or are using a valid symbolic
cue) the effect of a sudden luminance increment (the ultimate
exogenous cue)maybemutedor absent (Yantis and Jonides,1990).
Thus, our binary construction of cues as belonging to either one
of two disjoint types: endogenous or exogenous, is false. After a
number of studies, we now know that the delineation of cues into
exogenous or endogenous is imprecise, but despite this we don’t
know much more about attention per se.
These two examples illustrate the general problem. We have a
natural impulse to subdivide our observations into binary states.
When this designation is done prematurely, we spend time inves-
tigating the classiﬁcation instead of the underlying phenome-
non. Further, it hinders us from considering alternatives where a
continuous, graded, or fuzzy description would be more accurate.
ATTENTION HAS BEEN REIFIED
While our limited progress to date can be partially explained by
our inclination to conduct research as a game of 20 questions, an
approach ill-suited to psychological phenomena, a more impor-
tant problem is our language. We use the term attention to mean
different things and, more importantly, we have reiﬁed attention.
The result is research incorrectly focused on explaining attention
as a causal agent rather than the more correct conception where
attention is seen as a convenient semantic label for a category of
experimental result. We need to recognize attention is an effect
and not a cause.
The fact that attention is variably deﬁned, and that these mul-
tiple deﬁnitions obscure the implications of experimental work is
old news. For example, Allport (1993) writes “More fundamen-
tally what is meant by selection?” and a couple of paragraphs later,
“Similar, if not more confusing ambiguities surround the usage of
the term attention.”
One of our responses to this plurality of deﬁnitions has been
to rely on “Jamesian Conﬁdence.” James’ (1890/1950) famous
phrase: “Every one knows what attention is.” is implicitly (often
explicitly) invoked whenever researchers report work on attention
without supplying a concrete deﬁnition. The presumption is that
the researcher’s sense of attention will be clear from context and
that James’ exhortation can be taken to imply more than it says,
that is that everyone knows what attention is, and they all think it is
the same thing. In fact, communal practice reveals that we do not.
Attention is subdivided by modality (visual versus auditory), level
of analysis (feature versus object), and spatial extent (focal versus
global). Attention is invoked as the label for a general preparedness
to respond. Attention as vigilance has both a negative aspect (in
that one may fail to detect a target) and a positive aspect (where
one fails to inhibit a response when presented a non-target item).
Attention is treated as a vector where there can be deﬁciencies in
magnitude (implied by the phrase attention deﬁcit) or direction
(implied by a term like disengage deﬁcit). Attention can also be
given a temporal dimension when people speak of an attention
span. None of these senses seem quite what James had in mind as
the obvious one. Of course, some current workers still restrict the
word attention to James’ sense. Huang and Pashler (2007) refer
to attention in terms of conscious awareness and not the more
common selection. The problem with having so many deﬁnitions
extends beyond the risk of confusion. The fact that there are so
many variable deﬁnitions empowers researchers to create newer,
eclectic ones. Colby and Goldberg (1999) write that “. . .one could
say that their [lateral intraparietal neurons] activity selects targets
from the environment for possible but easily cancelable saccades.
The latter statement is a good deﬁnition of visual attention in the
primate.” I am not aware of anyone else using the selection of eas-
ily cancelable saccades as a good deﬁnition for attention, but given
that we have so many deﬁnitions for attention already, why not
one more?
On the one hand, attention’s many deﬁnitions may impede
research progress because they foil clear communication, but it
may also be the case that the existence of so many apparently
equally good deﬁnitions is a symptom of a more general problem:
a fundamentalmisconstrual of what is attention. This idea has also
been around since the advent of modern experimental psychology,
but it has not received the consideration it warrants. Cattell and
Farrand (1896) wrote that “. . .if we undertake to study attention
or suggestibility we ﬁnd it difﬁcult to measure deﬁnitely a deﬁnite
thing. . .” and this idea is echoed in more recent times by Johnston
and Dark (1986) “It is difﬁcult to conceptualize a process that is
not well deﬁned, and it is difﬁcult to falsify empirically a vague
conceptualization, especially one that relies on a homunculus.”
The difﬁculty with most of our modern work on attention
is that it inverts the relationship between cause and effect. Most
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modern work takes a causal position: attention causes faster reac-
tion times or enhanced perceptual processing. I assert attention
should be treated as an effect. When we do X in the laboratory
and see that responses become faster we might, for convenience,
label such an observation (when it is not explained by differences
at the level of primary sensory or motor systems) as “attentional.”
But the important question is what was it about the experimental
situation that produced this attentional effect?
The effect interpretation of attention has never been the pop-
ular orientation of psychologists when they design and interpret
their experiments, but it has been long recognized. In fact, in the
James’quote that begins this paper, James is summarizing the effect
position as a prelude to attacking it. Others have treated the idea
more positively (Johnston and Dark, 1986). Hebb (1949), in the
same work so often quoted for its foresight on synaptic learning
mechanisms, writes “When an experimental result makes it nec-
essary to refer to. . .‘attention,’ the reference means, precisely, that
the activity that controls the form, speed, strength, or duration of
response is not the immediately preceding excitation of receptor
cells alone. The fact that a response is not so controlled may be
hard to explain, theoretically; but it is not mystical. . .”
The false attribution of causal agency to an abstract concept
is known as reiﬁcation (sometimes also called hypostatization).
Reiﬁcation is used effectively in many literary constructions where
the technique is seen to provide an economical and evocative
phrasing that few would read literally. For example, “Love con-
quers all.” In scientiﬁc parlance reiﬁcation is both less obvious,
and more pernicious. And it is clearly at play in the way we most
frequently see the word attention used. It is not difﬁcult to ﬁnd
quotes like Spitzer et al. (1988) “It is concluded that increasing the
amount of attention directed toward a stimulus can enhance the
responsiveness and selectivity of the neurons that process it.” or
Colby and Goldberg (1999) “In other words, paying attention to
information in the receptive ﬁeld drives the neuronnomatterwhat
direction of saccade the monkey is planning.”We may deride the-
ories relying on homunculi, but we employ them when ever we use
the term “attention” for an unspeciﬁed causal agent. The fact that
many of uses of the term are vacuous can be demonstrated by sim-
ply deleting the termand seeingwhether the explanatory content is
signiﬁcantly reduced. For example, when Treisman (1985) writes:
“Some discriminations appear to be made automatically, without
attention and spatially in parallel across the visual ﬁeld. Other
visual operations require focused attention and can be performed
only serially.” the references to attention can be struck out with-
out losing any understanding of the empirical results, and their
inclusion doesn’t deepen our theoretical understanding; clearly
something explains the empirical differences, but the word “atten-
tion” as used here is just a place holder for that “something.” We
need to move beyond rhetorical accounts to more speciﬁc causal
theoretical accounts. We need to know what is it in a subject’s
experience that changes reaction time slopes or what it is about
the construction of our stimuli that enhances the responsivity, and
selectivity of some neurons. We should not be satisﬁed with the
insertion of the term attention as a theoretical wildcard.We should
be particularly careful of this practice when evaluating the theo-
retical import of neuroscience data. Because data on ﬁring rates
and BOLD activations are “hard” data, we feel more secure with
them, and we may fail to realize that by themselves neuroscience
data tell us nothing about what attention is.
NEUROSCIENCE, THEORY, AND ATTENTION
But psychology may ﬁnd it dangerous to turn to neurology
for help. Once you tell the world that another science will
explain what your key terms really mean, you must forgive
the world if it decides that the other science is doing the
important work. Skinner (1987).
The problem of dichotomies and reiﬁcation, though mostly illus-
trated by examples from psychology, are similarly present in neu-
roscience studies. For example, when multiple visual elements are
simultaneously present on a computer display, the investigatormay
speak of a cue directing attention to one of these and not the others
(“To address this question, we trained monkeys to covertly deploy
their visual attention from a central ﬁxation point to one of three
objects displayed in the periphery. . .” (Zhang et al., 2011). This
language demonstrates the use of dichotomy; attention is either
here or there, and not, for instance, some continuous distribution
over space or objects. Also, it reiﬁes attention, speaking of it as a
thing that can be deployed. Instead of developing hypotheses in
terms of the experimental variables, the effects of cues on neural
ﬁring rates, the authors interpose an explanatorily empty term:
attention.
This is not simply someone else’s problem. Anderson and
Sheinberg (2008) manipulated the timing of targets while record-
ing from anterior inferior temporal (aIT) neurons. aIT neurons
ﬁred more when a visual target was presented at the more likely
time.An easy account of these data is to report (as I did) the“effects
of temporal attention on spike rates.” But, to be precise, Anderson
and Sheinberg (2008) does not report a manipulation of attention.
It reports amanipulation of the lag between cues and visual targets,
and the validity of the cues for predicting delay. What is gained by
inserting the intermediary attention? Would not it be more direct
to assert that there are effects of prior probability on ﬁring rates
since the manipulation of prior probability was a concrete fact
of the experimental design? This would lead to a prediction that
the change in ﬁring rate should be proportionate to the change in
the predictive validity of the temporal cues. Such clear predictions
do not emerge if we are satisﬁed with asserting the presence of
attention, as a sort of mental phlogiston, that makes neat work of
our results. Perhaps because their data are “hard,” neuroscientists
seem less occupied with these semantic issues, but data cannot
disambiguate a reiﬁed term. Without a clear, predictive account
of what behavioral situations produce attentional effects, and how
they occur, our data collection will merely be piling up stones.
There is no EKG long enough to tell us what love is, nor can any
number of spike trains tell us what attention is.
Neuroscience data is the only type of data that will ever be able
to characterize the mechanisms by which brains yield attentional
phenomena. But without strong theoretical motivations for our
experiments and data analyses, we risk making spurious causal
claims. We do not want to do the neuroscience equivalent of con-
cluding that pneumonia drives an increase in bacterial division
because pneumonia-in cases always have higher bacterial counts
than pneumonia-out cases. Without a theory of pneumonia by
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which to interpret the signiﬁcance of changes in bacterial counts
we risk this sort of error. Without a theory of attention by which
to interpret neural activity we risk the same sort of error. Compu-
tational models of attention that are framed without recourse to
an attentional black box can serve this purpose.
The term attention developed colloquially to describe an intro-
spectively accessible human experience. It was drafted as a tech-
nical term to characterize a pattern of behavioral observations.
For neither colloquial nor technical use can we determine the
nature of attention from its neural correlates. Characterizing the
terminology of human behavior and experience is the domain of
psychology. Cognitive neuroscience contributes once a consistent
experimentallymeaningfully terminologyhas been agreed.Neuro-
science will tell us much of what we want to know about attention,
but only once it has been yoked to a robust theory of what it is
about particular experimental conditions that yields attentional
effects. The limitations of neuroscience are not technical, but epis-
temic. Reviewing the vast and interesting neuroscience literature
on attention will not advance us toward our goal of developing a
terminology for attention that is experimentally and theoretically
fecund.
BIASED COMPETITION: SPOTLIGHT ON A NEW METAPHOR
The biased competition model of attention is sometimes offered
as a new theory of attention that reﬂects our growth in knowl-
edge. However, it is really a new metaphor and not a new theory.
Biased competition captures two cardinal phenomena of visual
attention: limited capacity and selectivity. From these are posited
the general schema where elements (visual objects or pools of
neurons) compete for control. The competition is biased in favor
of the objects that are most behaviorally relevant (Desimone and
Duncan, 1995). From a neural perspective, biased competition is a
theory of implementation. How do neurons adjudicate their joint
response? Through a system of competition and modiﬁcation that
yields a winner take all result. From a psychological perspective,
biased competition is a summary label for attentional phenomena.
Wehave known for at least a century that a research subject’s report
can be adjusted by instruction (Helmholtz, 1881). Using biased
competition to summarize this idea is a succinct terminology for
an attentional effect, we have a change in awareness that cannot
be ascribed to a change in receptor stimulation (Hebb, 1949). But
having characterized the basic experimental data thus,we have not
advanced theory. This does not seem to be a conclusion that is at
odds with recent summaries of the biased competition concept
(Duncan, 2006). After beginning with a quote from Wittgenstein,
Duncan (2006) states that attention is probably undeﬁnable. Dun-
can writes that “[while]. . .‘attentional’ phenomena. . .have family
resemblances, it seems unlikely that they share any one deﬁning
component. . .” In general, one does not put scare quotes around
words for which one is pronouncing a theory. Like the spotlight
metaphor, biased competition nicely summarizes and emphasizes
key aspects of the experimental phenomena. Duncan writes “At
least in some form, these ideas [biased competition] are implicit
in any reasonable account of attentional limits.”
It is not a criticism of biased competition to point out that it
is not a theory of attention. Just as the spotlight metaphor has its
role as a convenient summary of data and as a way to structure our
intuitions, so does the metaphor of biased competition. The cen-
tral question if we want to construct a causal theory of attention
on the basis of biased competition is to determine what consti-
tutes bias? What does it mean to be relevant? How do we avoid
the circularity of asserting that behavioral relevance produces bias
and that observing bias indicates the relative relevance of simulta-
neously present stimuli? In considering whether we have learned
anything new about attention via the terminology of biased com-
petition, we must ask ourselves whether, if we knew the answer to
Duncan’s question: “. . .how does the brain establish what is rele-
vant and what is not?”, we would have any residual need for the
terms bias or attention? The ideas of biased competition would
remain but once we can describe behavior, perception, and neural
activity from “. . .the antecedents of the attending process in the
individual himself and in the material that offers itself from the
outside world.” (Pillsbury, 1922) we will have eliminated the need
for a theory of attention at all.
WHAT AN ALTERNATIVE TERMINOLOGY OF ATTENTION
SHOULD SOUND LIKE
To copy Duncan in copying Wittgenstein: “Wovon man nicht
sprechen kann, darüber mußman schweigen.”2 We need the right
terms if we are to say something meaningful, and, to this point, I
have not offered such a terminology. My argument has been pri-
marily critical. I have claimed that our use of the word attention
as referring to a particular individual thing that directly causes
changes in perception and neuron ﬁring is ﬂawed. I would like
to conclude on a more constructive note by offering an alterna-
tive conceptual foundation that does not dichotomize or reify, and
yields a terminology inwhich attentional effects are seen to emerge
as a consequence of speciﬁc and experimentally manipulable fac-
tors. To be useful experimentally, our terminology should predict
howquantitative variationwill translate intobehavioral andneural
effects. A terminology that meets all these requirements and which
has been increasingly used in psychology is the Bayesian terminol-
ogy. Jones and Love (2010) assert that “Bayesian analysis can serve
as a useful starting point when investigating a new domain. . .”
This can be extended to the claim that Bayesian analysis is useful
for attention if we change “a new” to “anew a.” Early applications
of Bayesian ideas to the study of attentional phenomena reveal the
utility of this language.
BAYESIAN DECISION ACCOUNTS OF ATTENTIONAL PHENOMENA
A Bayesian decision process (BDP) is a computational structure
that provides, as output, an estimate of the cost (or gain) to
be expected from undertaking speciﬁed actions in an uncertain
setting. As input the BDP needs some speciﬁcation of the costs
associated with particular actions in particular states, an estimate
of the prior probability of those states, and somedata fromwhich it
can compute the likelihoodof that data assuming a particular state.
These components map cleanly onto the experimental circum-
stances that are commonly employed in attentional research and
they ﬁt the requirement that they implicitly capture the common
sense features required of any “reasonable account of attentional
2Whereof one cannot speak, thereof must one be silent.
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limits” (Duncan, 2006). The mapping to the ideas of biased com-
petition is direct. The likelihood function of the BDP establishes
the basis for competition: how likely is what I am seeing, assum-
ing any one of the possible causes? This competition is biased by
expectations and the accumulation of evidence over time. From
experience the subject has an estimate of how likely are the possi-
ble causes. Those things which happen more often receive a bias in
proportion to their relative frequencies. The notion of relevance
is further handled by the cost/gain function. Things are impor-
tant because they yield high rewards or run substantial risks. The
result of this computation is a decision. Our perception is the
result of this covert deliberation. The fuzzy concepts of relevance
and bias implicit in instructions and history are made numerical
and unambiguous in the BDP framework.
Bayesian decision process components also map well onto
experimental variables. This makes our common experimental
approaches amenable to objective assessment within the BDP ter-
minology. As an example, consider the generic experiment where
a participant has to report some aspect of a visual stimulus (such
as presence versus absence or brightness).We can manipulate how
often different classes of stimuli appear, how certain are envi-
ronmental features (i.e., cues) to predict targets, and how much
reward, either in juice, money, or auditory feedback, we provide
for correct responses (and how we punish errors, too). These
are the sorts of experiments we use to demonstrate attentional
effects. These manipulations change prior probability, likelihood,
and cost/beneﬁts.
Experimental results conﬁrm the relevance of these compo-
nents. For example,visual search tasks are commonly used to assess
attention. According to the BDP formulation, locations of high
probability should have a higher search priority (Koopman, 1956).
In a classic result, Shaw and Shaw (1977) conﬁrmed this ﬁnding.
In their experiment subjects searched for a letter after learning the
probabilities for letter locations. The conditional probability for
detecting stimuli given their location was, for three of four human
subjects tested, consistent with the model of optimal performance
that allocated search resources in proportion to probability.
What is contextual cuing (Chun, 2000) but a demonstration
that visual search prioritizes location based on prior probability?
The same basic result has also been given an explicitly Bayesian for-
mulation byEckstein et al. (2006). Their subjects looked at pictures
with elements in expected or unexpected locations or, critically,
absent. The pattern of ﬁrst saccades in target absent images was
directed toward probable locations and was well described by a
differential, Bayesian, weighting model.
The likelihood function in a Bayesian formulation can be
captured by the idea of noise and reliability. When uncertainty
increases visual detection declines. For example, Lasley and Cohn
(1981) brieﬂy illuminated an LED and manipulated the num-
ber of non-overlapping temporal intervals in which the stimulus
could appear. Stimulus discriminability, reported as d ′, decreased
monotonically with increasing stimulus uncertainty. A likelihood
function provides a link to data on visual image discriminability
and target ambiguity (Duncan and Humphreys, 1989).
Bayesian probability models are increasingly common in psy-
chology (Jones and Love, 2010), and are beginning to be used
for predicting attentional effects. For example, salience, a com-
mon term for the tendency of some regions of space to attract
gaze, has often been stated in the past to attract attention. Najem-
nik and Geisler (2005) and Zhang et al. (2008) are two recent
examples that provide an alternative, Bayesian account. These
results demonstrate how Bayes’ formula can be used to relate
the conditional probabilities of causes given consequences to the
probabilities of consequences given causes. Such Bayesian models
show the power of this approach and can be used, for example,
to compute the probability of a target’s location from probabil-
ity distributions for relevant features, locations, knowledge about
how likely particular features are for particular targets, and the
statistics of natural images. These types of models provide speciﬁc
predictions for eyemovement trajectories that canbedirectly com-
pared to the human eye movement data from inspecting identical
images. As these sorts of models give a good account of where
we look and why we look there in terms of the properties of
our environment and our experiences, why do we need the term
attention?
The incorporation of a cost function into a Bayesian model to
turn it into aBDP is less common,but greatly enriches thepotential
of a Bayesian formulation to account for attentional phenomena.
The cost function is the part of the BDP terminology that captures
and quantiﬁes the metric for behavioral relevance that is at the
heart of the idea of biased competition. Where there is an objec-
tivemeasure of cost or gain, attentionalmetrics can be predicted to
align with actions that prioritize the detection of relevant events:
those at the extremes of beneﬁt and risk.
Another strength of the BDP formalism is that it describes
how to integrate these different components. If you manipulate
the prior probability of stimuli (e.g., by manipulating the predic-
tive validity of antecedent cues), and you offer different rewards
for different detections, then you can predict the order of your
response measures to each manipulation alone and in combina-
tion (Liston and Stone, 2008). The combination of these factors
can explain data better than any one factor. Milstein and Dorris
(2007) demonstrated this idea when they had people saccade to
one of two targets while varying the probability of the target side.
They also varied the reward associated with targets on each side
and found that the combination of monetary value and probabil-
ity correlated negatively with response time (greater value faster
response). Directly linking the idea to attentional phenomena, the
authors occasionally displayed a distractor on the screen at varying
distances from one of the target locations and found that the dis-
tractor was more likely to capture a saccade, in this task an error,
when it was near a high value x high probability target. The com-
bination of these factors was a better explanation than any one of
them (Milstein and Dorris, 2007).
The possibility of a circular argument, introduced into the
biased competition account by reference to the concept of rele-
vance, is also a risk when using the BDP terminology. It would be
tempting to say that if all options were equally likely and equally
discriminable, then the class of response chosen most quickly or
most often must, therefore, be the one with the greatest beneﬁt or
highest relevance. The way to avoid this problem is to construct
an objective metric for quantifying the basis for such a preference
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and then to test this idea in an independent setting. As an exam-
ple, it has been suggested that novelty contributes to relevance.
Therefore, novel items in displays of familiar distractors pop-out
(Strayer and Johnston,2000; Johnston andStrayer,2001). Butwhat
does itmean to be novel, hownovel is“novel?”Itti and Baldi (2009)
have developed an objective Bayesian approach to quantiﬁcation.
Itti and Baldi (2009) compare our estimate of the probability of
a hypothesis before and after we observe some data. If our esti-
mate changes a lot then the data were probably surprising. The
updating mechanism for converting a prior probability into a pos-
terior uses Bayes’ formula applied to the prior and the likelihood
distributions. The Kullback–Leibler distance, a way of measuring
how far apart two probability distributions are, provides the met-
ric for comparing the old prior and the new posterior to give a
wow, the measure of how“surprising”were the data. Itti and Baldi
(2009) ﬁnd a good concordance between where people look and
this metric of surprise.
Again, an advantage of the BDP approach, something that
is difﬁcult to do with the reiﬁed view of attention as a cause,
is to combine components cleanly. If the prior probability of
informative areas of a visual display were varied, and if spatially
inhomogeneous noise were applied to the display, then all three
factors (prior, likelihood, and surprise) could be combined and
compared in a single experiment. The BDP formula provides the
mathematical relationship; since all the components are proba-
bility distributions they are all commensurate, the combination
yields an unambiguous prediction.
One of the attractions of the biased competition account of
attention is the natural way it connect psychological ideas with
neural implementations. While I have argued that neural data are
not directly relevant to the debate about what conception of atten-
tion is the right one, cause or effect, a valuable element of the BDP
terminology is that it has the qualities of being a good theoreti-
cal guide for neuroscientiﬁc investigations of attentional effects.
Neuronal tuning curves can be easily imagined as measures of
stimulus likelihood (Ma et al., 2006), neuronal populations can
be said to ﬁre in proportion to estimates of probability (Janssen
and Shadlen, 2005) and other neuronal populations give an index
of the expected value of an action (Padoa-Schioppa and Assad,
2006). Furthermore, themechanisms of synaptic plasticity provide
the basis for learning these distributions. More probable stimuli
lead to greater synaptic modiﬁcations. A BDP account can pro-
vide a psychological explanation for attention that emerges from
the activities of neurons. A psychological account of attention in
the language of the BDP offers an easy route to extending the ideas
to computationalmodeling (Yu et al., 2009; Chikkerur et al., 2010).
While these examples point a way forward, Bayesian formulations
of attentional phenomena cannot be regarded as mainstream. The
word “Bayes” does not appear in either a recent review of visual
attention (Carrasco, 2011) or an elaboration of one of the more
long lived and well regarded models of attention (Bundesen et al.,
2011).
CONCLUSION
Early on I referenced Newell (1973) and his famous 20 questions
essay. In that essay Newell develops prescriptions for what psycho-
logical explanations of psychological phenomena should look like.
Newell suggests that we should build complete processing mod-
els rather than partial ones, second, we should either choose for
analysis one big complex task or show that our single processing
model accounts for numerous smaller tasks. A BDP is a complex
model for a complex task that can be addressed by application to
numerous smaller, more focused, experiments.
My resort to an attack on our terminology might be classed
as an example of the poor workman blaming his tools, but as I
have sampled the literature from the last 100 years, I have been
struck by the creativity and intelligence of attention researchers.
If their attack has not been successful, it is not for a failure of skill
or ingenuity, rather it is because we need new tools. Refashioning
the old tools simply will not do. To the man with a hammer not
only does everything look like a nail, but such a man is equally
likely to use his hammer as a shoehorn, door stop, backscratcher,
and pounding square pegs into round holes. We need to discard
our causal conceptions of attention and adopt effect accounts. A
process model, like a BDP, is one reasonable starting point for us
to begin anew.
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